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ORIGINAL
Health care professionals are required by health care regulators to rationally and analytically 
resolve ethical dilemmas involving the people they encounter, putting the interests of those people 
first, respecting their decisions and upholding their rights. This can be a challenging task as many 
situations are complex and require professionals to provide care in an objective and compassionate 
manner regardless of their own views. Midwives and allied health professionals are directed by the 
Nursing and Midwifery Council’s The Code: professional standards of practice and behaviour for 
nurses and midwives (NMC 2015) and as always, the best interests of the person they are caring for 
are paramount. 
The scenario allows me to critically explore 
and evaluate the legal, ethical and professional 
implications arising from the issues. Within the paper 
I shall critically analyse the differing judgments within 
related case law, outlining different approaches, 
exploring the validity of alternative options, 
and appraising relevant literature to support my 
argument. Ethical theory linked to the scenario will be 
applied to explore the role of professionals and their 
accountability and responsibility for ensuring that 
Laura’s needs are fully met within the constraints of 
the situation. I will conclude by stating my view of the 
most appropriate course of action as a professional, 
justifying it by the debates made throughout the essay 
(box opposite).
Scenario:
Laura who has schizophrenia, is 30 weeks’ pregnant, and 
is refusing medication and treatment.  Her partner is 
concerned and contacts the midwife to help him  
and Laura.
Exploring the scenario
The issues arising from the scenario include:
• Laura, a schizophrenic, is no longer taking medication  
that may be impacting on her responses, leading to  
physical aggression. 
• She is 30 weeks’ pregnant and her partner is concerned 
that she may be in premature labour. Laura may not  
be aware of, or influenced by this possible diagnosis.  
Either way treatment would be recommended to 
exclude delivery at home of a seriously premature baby.
• Laura is refusing care although she is accepting of the 
midwife’s attendance. Her capacity and competence 
to make decisions may be compromised and requires 
exploration to ensure care is appropriate to the situation.  
It should not be assumed that Laura’s capacity is 
diminished solely because of her mental health issues, as 
mental health patients do not always have diminished 
cognitive function.
• Laura’s decision-making ability to allow consent is  
linked to capacity. Although Laura’s ultimate decision 
may appear unwise, refusal to give consent is an 
autonomous act and if she has capacity, her wishes 
should be respected. Professionals should be mindful 
of possible coercion or persuasion by her partner, 
motivated by concern for her and their baby.
• The rights of the unborn fetus, which do not exist in law 
until the baby is born, will be examined in respect of 
the potential criminal liability of the mother to the child 
and whether the fetus has rights under Article 2 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998.
• The professional’s role in providing care for Laura and 
her baby, reassuring her partner and providing ethical 
advice, mindful of legal principles, is firstly governed 
by the fact that the midwife cannot, in law, refuse to 
attend a woman in childbirth. The option to not respond, 
hoping that this will provoke attendance at hospital 
where there is considerably more support, including 
legal advice, is not an option and determines the 
midwife’s ethical practice.
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Ethical practice
Though not always consciously aware, we make 
judgments daily about what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’.  
The terms are subjective and their meaning derived 
from values that guide our lives, termed ‘directional 
signals’ by Thompson (2004:175) or a ‘moral order’ 
by Torres & De Vries (2009:14). Thompson discussed 
a ‘values lens’ that forms our view of situations and 
advises midwives working with women to understand 
how this can affect how they interact with, and 
provide care for women (Thompson 2004:175). 
Ogston-Tuck (2014) asserts that being ethical 
requires the professional to first be aware of the 
existence of a moral or ethical situation. Thompson 
described how medical ethics arose from the need 
to protect vulnerable patients from paternalistic 
codes of behaviour, focused more on the duties 
of doctors to each other than their obligation to 
patients (Thompson 2004). Principlism, a method of 
ethical problem solving outlined by Beauchamp and 
Childress (2009), guides professionals in practising 
ethically, ensuring that the rights of childbearing 
women are respected by professionals with the over-
riding principle of care based on the obligation to see 
those rights maintained (Torres & De Vries 2009). 
Mason & Laurie (2013) maintain that ethics is not 
simply about discovering what is right, as that is 
simplistic and subjective. Instead they describe how 
professionals can justify a course of action utilising 
principles to assist in their decision making. The 
NMC Code requires professionals to always put 
the patient first, providing safe effective care whilst 
promoting trust and professionalism (NMC 2015).
Consent and capacity
The right to choose a course of action is safeguarded 
by the principle of autonomy (Taylor 2013) and 
protected in policy and law (Re C (Adult: refusal 
of treatment) [1994], Mental Capacity Act 2005 
(MCA 2005), Department of Health (DH) 2009). 
For the health care professional to avoid a claim of 
battery, it is essential that adults, who are judged 
to be competent, be afforded the opportunity to 
provide valid consent before proceeding with medical 
interventions. Consent can render physical contact 
lawful whereby a patient’s consent makes touching 
legally permitted (Mason & Laurie 2013). One’s 
motive for the professional touching, ie if the act 
is designed to help the person, is irrelevant if the 
patient does not consent. Consent must therefore be 
voluntary, free from coercion or undue influence as 
upheld in Re T (Adult: refusal of medical treatment) 
[1992]. The judgment held that T’s mother had 
pressurised and influenced her, so her decision had 
not been made independently. The Court of Appeal 
(CA) found that her mental capacity was impaired 
due to injuries and medication and that she had not 
been provided with sufficient information to make 
an informed decision. The CA upheld her right of 
self-determination but considered there was serious 
doubt about the legitimacy of her decision, due to 
the factors that influenced that decision. The Court 
emphasised professionals’ duty of care to check the 
validity of decisions made and ensure that patients 
have mental capacity and are not unduly influenced. 
This would be a consideration in Laura’s case where 
her partner’s anxiety and ‘value lens’ may create 
pressure for her to accept treatment that she does 
not want. The principle of self-determination was 
explored in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993]:846, 
which decreed that ‘the sanctity of human life 
must yield to the principles of self determination’, 
whereby it is against the law to force treatment 
even if the outcome was death. This however, is 
subject to exclusions in that the person making the 
decision must have the capacity to do so (Taylor 
2013), though it is generally accepted in law that 
adult patients have decision-making capacity, unless 
evidence shows otherwise (MCA 2005). A decision 
made with full capacity must be respected even if 
it appears unwise or irrational. Where capacity is 
questioned, Section 2 of the MCA (2005) provides 
guidance for professionals. The legislation is quite 
unequivocal in stating that lack of capacity cannot be 
established by reference to:
‘(a) a person’s age or appearance, or (b) a condition  
of his, or an aspect of his behaviour, which might  
lead others to make unjustified assumptions about  
his capacity’ (MCA 2005:s2).
Having certain medical disorders, including 
mental illness, should not lead to a presumption of 
incapacity (Simpson 2011). Furthermore, Lamont 
et al (2013) claim that the concepts that determine 
whether an individual is capable of making informed 
choices regarding health issues are ‘capacity’ and 
‘competence’. Though interchangeable the terms have 
different meanings. Capacity is a health outcome 
decided by health care professionals referring to a 
specific decision as opposed to the legal outcome of 
competence, determined by judges. 
The test for capacity was set out in Re C (Adult: 
refusal of treatment) [1994] and formed the basis for 
the capacity test in the MCA (2005). In Re C, a case 
with similarities to Laura’s, C, a schizophrenic, was 
refusing amputation of his leg. The judgment was 
that although he had serious mental illness, he had 
the required level of competence, therefore capacity, 
to make an informed decision. The subsequent test 
outlined in Section 3 of the MCA (2005:S3(1)) tests 
the individual’s decision to understand, retain, weigh-
up or balance the information and communicate 
the decision by whatever means he can. The MCA 
sets out the principles, which ensure protection of 
vulnerable patients, including preventing professionals 
proceeding with treatment of a patient without 
consent ‘merely because he makes an unwise decision’ 
(MCA 2005:1). 
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Testing Laura’s capacity can be undertaken by any 
registered health care professional though not all have 
expertise in this matter (Simpson 2011) and every 
effort should be made to communicate effectively in 
familiar surroundings. O’Brien (2010) suggests that 
clinicians should attempt to reach the same decision 
as a court would in the same situation. Awareness 
of intermittent states of capacity, known in law as 
a ‘lucid interval’, is important and the professional 
should ensure that consent, if given, is provided 
during a lucid interval for it to be valid. Awareness of 
the ability of a patient to have the capacity to make 
some decisions and not others in a given situation is 
also vital. Clear recording of the assessment is key to 
ensure an accurate representation of the conversation 
and ensuing treatment plan. 
Babbitt et al (2014) outline the difficulty for clinicians 
when caring for women with major mental health 
problems, especially when presenting in labour, 
agitated or psychotic, where there is limited decision-
making time. Laura’s assessment should distinguish 
between disordered cognitive function and long-
standing personal beliefs whilst taking into account 
the effect of labour pain on her. In Re T (Adult: 
refusal of treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649 at 665, 
Lord Donaldson acknowledged that capacity might 
be absent as a result of the ‘effects of fatigue, shock, 
pain or drugs’ being used in treatment. Assessment 
of Laura would have to determine if the effect of 
pain and agitation linked to labour or schizophrenia 
affected her ability to retain and understand the 
information relevant to a specific decision. Section 
3(3) of the MCA (2005) clearly states ‘the fact that 
a person is able to retain the information relevant to 
a decision for a short period of time only does not 
prevent him from being regarded as able to make  
the decision’ (MCA 2005:s3(3)).
Laura may be able to decide on some aspects of 
her care and not others and this is determined 
by examination of her capacity. Professionals’ 
knowledge of mental illness is important to prevent 
the assumption of equating acceptance of treatment 
with capacity, whilst refusal means a lack of capacity 
(O’Brien 2010). Amer (2013) states that although 
patients with schizophrenia have a greater link 
with incapacity than those with serious depression, 
judgment of competence is specific to the particular 
decision about treatment and the schizophrenic 
patient with paranoid delusions may be capable of 
deciding treatment for a different medical condition. 
In contrast, Epright (2010) argues that patients with 
affective disorders such as schizophrenia are not 
capable of exercising informed refusal, specifically 
because of their lack of insight into the impact of 
their disorders. Epright (2010) claimed that psychotic 
diseases negatively impacted on the areas of the brain 
necessary for rational thought and that coercion of 
treatment in the short term would ultimately be in the 
best interests of the patient. Epright (2010) justified 
this paternalistic approach stating that the inherent 
lack of insight meant that the patient could not act 
autonomously to choose to withhold treatment. 
Furthermore, Epright (2010) argued for withholding 
all future decision making because even if not 
psychotic now, likely future psychotic episodes would 
render the patient incapable and put others at risk.
This view clearly places the patient outside the 
decision-making process by advocating removal of the 
option to refuse treatment. The lack of recognition 
of patient autonomy is in line with the original 
concept within the Hippocratic Oath, which asserts 
that medical practitioners should provide whatever 
treatment is required for the benefit of the patient 
using their professional judgment. This is termed a 
‘warrant for paternalism’ by Lamont et al (2013:702). 
Managing this dissonance is part of a professional’s 
role and negotiating a clear, patient-centred focus 
is part of personal and professional accountability 
required of all health care practitioners.
Best interests and decision making
The significant difference between refusal to accept 
treatment and an inability to make a decision is 
capacity. Should Laura be found to have capacity 
to balance information and make a decision, even if 
that is felt to be unwise by the professionals, then her 
choice should be accepted. This can be challenging 
for professionals when faced with a decision as in 
St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S; R v Collins, 
ex parte S [1998]. In this case, S, a pregnant woman 
refusing to accept urgent delivery, was operated on 
under compulsion, and later held under the Court of 
Appeal that the judge had been given inadequate or 
misleading information. Although S had offered no 
resistance to the obstetric team, consent could not be 
presumed simply due to a lack of physical struggle. 
The judgment was that: 
‘A pregnant woman’s right not to be forced to an 
invasion of her body against her will, whether her 
own life or that of her unborn child depended on it, 
was not reduced or diminished merely because her 
exercise of that right might appear to be morally 
repugnant’ (St George’s Healthcare v S [1998] 44 
BMLR 160 at 162).
If she is unable to fulfill the test outlined in the MCA 
(2005), then a decision taking her best interests into 
account should be facilitated. In the case Norfolk and 
Norwich Healthcare NHS Trust v W [1997], where a 
patient arrived in labour, denying she was pregnant and 
refusing delivery, the judgment was that though she 
was not found to be suffering from a mental disorder, 
she was incapable of balancing the information and 
therefore lacked sufficient mental competence to make 
a decision. Termination of her pregnancy by delivery 
was considered to be in her best interests.
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If the patient is unable or incapable of decision 
making, best interests should take into account what 
the patient’s previous views were, as long as the 
professional focuses on the patient’s interests not 
the doctor’s wishes (Kelly 2011). The DH (2009) 
guidance suggests that it is good practice to involve 
those closest to the patient to establish previously 
held views and beliefs, unless the patient has clearly 
said she does not want those people involved 
(Simpson 2011). Using the Bolam v Friern Hospital 
Management Committee test [1957], the clinician 
is the primary decision maker for non-competent 
patients but Laura’s partner would be a resource 
for outlining what her wishes were earlier in the 
pregnancy should she be found to be incapable of 
making a decision. It is important to recognise that 
he may also be conflicted by concern for the unborn 
baby and may have clouded judgment in this matter. 
The rights of the unborn child do not take precedent 
in law over the rights of the mother.
Rights of the unborn child
Article 2 of the European Convention states that 
‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law’ 
(HRA 1998). The only proviso to this relates 
to execution of a sentence following conviction 
sanctioned in law. The right to life does not extend 
to the unborn child in the UK as the fetus is not 
regarded as a legal entity and any action could only 
be brought after birth (Dimond 2013). Dimond 
(2013) raises the question of whether the mother’s 
actions in pregnancy, which might bring harm to the 
fetus, could constitute a criminal act. Nonetheless, 
Dimond (2013) concludes that it is unlikely unless her 
actions can be brought within the Offences Against 
the Person Act 1861 or the Infant Life (Preservation) 
Act 1929 whilst acknowledging that it would be 
difficult to determine the required criminal intent 
to proceed to a prosecution. St George’s Healthcare 
NHS Trust v S [1998] 44 BMLR 160 at 181 made it 
very clear that:
‘While pregnancy increased the personal 
responsibilities of a woman, it did not extinguish 
her entitlement to decide whether or not to undergo 
medical treatment: an unborn child was not a separate 
person from its mother’. 
Delivery of the baby under compulsion was considered 
to be ‘an infringement of S’s autonomy, for which the 
perceived needs of the foetus could not provide the 
necessary justification’ (St Georges Healthcare NHS 
Trust v S [1998] 44 BMLR 160 at 181).
In their judgment their Lordships referred to Re S 
(Adult: refusal of treatment) [1992] where it was 
ruled that delivery of the baby could not be expedited 
to save the woman’s and her unborn baby’s life, even 
though this was contrary to her beliefs. Sir Stephen 
Brown held that the procedure was in the ‘vital 
interests of the patient and her unborn child’ (Re S 
(Adult: refusal of treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 671 at 
672). This judgment was later overturned and led to 
considerable professional debate and the production 
of guidance from the Royal College of Obstetricians 
and Gynaecologists Ethics Committee (RCOG 2006) 
supporting the stance that overruling the refusal of 
treatment by a competent woman is inappropriate 
even if it places her, and her unborn child’s life at risk.
The rights, or lack, of the fetus, was further clarified 
in Re MB (Adult: medical treatment) [1997], which 
stipulated that:
‘a competent woman who has the capacity to decide 
may, for religious reasons, other reasons, or for no 
reasons at all, chose not to have medical intervention, 
even though, as we have stated, the consequence may 
be death or serious handicap of the child she bears or 
her own death’ (Re MB (Adult: medical treatment) 
[1997]:60).
The judgment held that the court does not have the 
power to protect the interests of the unborn baby 
even just prior to its birth. This is reflected in the 
Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976, 
stating that action is given to the child only if born 
alive, for harm caused by negligence to the mother. 
The mother is not liable to the child, with the 
exception of driving a motor vehicle and in breach 
of duty of care. Laura’s unborn child, therefore, has 
no legal weight but its potential life will be part of 
the discussions between Laura and the professionals. 
It is essential, despite the conflict the professional 
may feel in this situation, that unbiased, clear 
information is provided and that emotion does not 
allow paternalism to emerge if Laura is found to have 
capacity but refuses treatment.
Refusal to consent
Under UK law, an adult with competence has an 
irrefutable right to refuse any medical intervention, 
reflecting the legal standing of respecting a person’s 
right to determine what happens to her body 
(Bingham 2012). Conflict and ethical dilemmas arise 
when the refusal appears to place life or health in 
danger and is complicated further when an unborn 
baby is involved. The rights of the unborn baby 
do not overrule the right of the woman to refuse 
treatment if capacity is in place. In Re MB (Adult: 
medical treatment) [1997] MB contested the validity 
of the decision to overrule her refusal of treatment 
due to lack of capacity from severe needle phobia. 
The Court held that a pregnant woman has a similar 
entitlement for respect of her wishes as anyone else 
and a person with capacity cannot be forced to 
endure treatment against her will, without risk of 
prosecution. A further point made was when faced 
with refusal of consent that:
‘doctors should consider whether at that time he 
had the capacity which is commensurate with the 
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gravity of the decision which he purported to make. 
The more serious the decision, the greater the 
capacity required’ (Re MB (Adult: medical treatment) 
[1997]:18).
In Ms B v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002], B was 
declared mentally competent but the physicians 
refused to comply with her wishes to refuse treatment. 
The judgment was that:
‘Unless the gravity of the illness has affected the 
patient’s capacity, a seriously disabled patient has 
the same rights as the fit person to respect personal 
autonomy. There is a serious danger, exemplified in 
this case, of a benevolent paternalism which does not 
embrace recognition of the personal autonomy of the 
severely disabled patient’ (Ms B v An NHS Hospital 
[2002]:94).
In Re MB (Adult: medical treatment) [1997] and in 
St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1998] it was 
clear that the use of mental health legislation for 
detention in order to pursue non-mental  
health treatment was inappropriate and unlawful. 
This action would also be unethical when 
benchmarked against the requirement to act in the 
best interest of patients lacking capacity. Failing 
to accept a competent patient’s wishes, as in Ms B, 
was also considered unlawful. Doctors had acted 
lawfully in overriding MB’s refusal of treatment, 
in her belief that her irrational fear clouded her 
judgment, temporarily affecting capacity. Bingham 
(2012) considered this to be an example of justifiable 
paternalism but warned of the danger of unethical 
practice of professionals overriding a competent 
patient’s decision, based on their own personal beliefs. 
This is reiterated in the NMC Code (2015). 
Accountability and advocacy
Griffith (2011) describes accountability as having its 
basis in law due to the formal relationship between 
midwives and the regulatory body or employer 
that holds them to account. Being accountable 
requires one to be answerable for all care provided 
or not and to understand when to seek help when 
practising outside one’s sphere of competence or 
knowledge. The basis of decision making in medical 
practice is founded on the belief that individuals 
are autonomous and that health care professionals’ 
practice should reflect the principles of respect for 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice 
(MacLellan 2014). This approach should dissuade 
giving information influenced by one’s personal 
beliefs or values and reflects the standard expected 
of professionals within the NMC Code (2015). 
The expectation is that professionals understand 
the nature of advocacy and accountability so they 
can recognise the risk of power imbalance between 
the patient and the caregiver and provide dignified 
respectful care. The case law described earlier 
provides additional assistance in complex, ethically 
challenging situations but not all professionals realise 
their practice breaches ethical principles leading to 
a disregard for patient autonomy and unethical, 
paternalistic practice. Midwives cannot refuse to 
attend a childbearing woman and to do so in this 
circumstance would be unethical, breaching ethical 
and regulatory standards. 
Laura’s case is complex and to ensure it is 
appropriately managed, placing her at the centre 
of her care, additional support is available for the 
midwife and should be requested. Her capacity to 
make decisions should be tested using the steps set 
out in the MCA (2005). A midwife is capable of doing 
this but should access support. Should capacity be 
absent, a decision taking her best interests, past beliefs 
and views into account should be made, accessing 
information from her partner. This may require 
recourse to mental health professionals to assess 
whether detention for assessment under s2 of the 
Mental Health Act 1983 is necessary if admission is 
required and refused by Laura. Ultimately, though the 
fetus is a factor in this instance, it has no rights in law 
and Laura’s care takes priority. Should Laura have 
capacity and be capable of making decisions, even 
if it involves the refusal of care, the midwife should 
respect that decision and provide what support she 
can, accessing support necessary to preserve safety. 
Clear and accurate record keeping is vital in this 
situation to demonstrate professional accountability 
(DH 2009, NMC 2015).
Conclusion
Professionals faced with ethical dilemmas in care 
are rarely prepared for them and the understanding 
and knowledge of ethical frameworks as well as the 
relevant law will guide their actions and responses. 
Understanding the principles behind upholding 
the right to self-determination whilst protecting 
vulnerable patients is fundamental to compassionate, 
ethical practice. The relevant law and the MCA 
(2005) safeguards patients but it is the ethical 
enactment of those guiding principles by professionals 
that ensures that patient autonomy remains central to 
the care provided. 
Toni Martin, Lead Midwife for Education, Programme 
Leader-Midwifery, University of Worcester.
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